Abstract. Defensive JavaScript (DJS) is a typed subset of JavaScript that guarantees that the functional behavior of a program cannot be tampered with even if it is loaded by and executed within a malicious environment under the control of the attacker. As such, DJS is ideal for writing JavaScript security components, such as bookmarklets, single sign-on widgets, and cryptographic libraries, that may be loaded within untrusted web pages alongside unknown scripts from arbitrary third parties. We present a tutorial of the DJS language along with motivations for its design. We show how to program security components in DJS, how to verify their defensiveness using the DJS typechecker, and how to analyze their security properties automatically using ProVerif.
Introduction
Since the advent of asynchronous web applications, popularly called AJAX or Web 2.0, JavaScript has become the predominant programming language for client-side web applications. JavaScript programs are widely deployed as scripts in web pages, but also as small storable snippets called bookmarklets, as downloadable web apps, 1 and as plugins or extensions to popular browsers. 2 Mainstream browsers compete with each other in providing convenient APIs and fast JavaScript execution engines. More recently, Javascript is being used to program smartphone and desktop applications 3 , and also cloud-based server applications, 4 so that now programmers can use the same idioms and libraries to write and deploy a variety of client-and server-side programs.
As more and more sensitive user data passes though JavaScript applications, its confidentiality and integrity becomes an important security goal. Consequently, JavaScript applications rely on a number of security libraries for cryptography and access control. However, neither the JavaScript language nor its execution environment (e.g. the web browser) are particularly well suited for security programming. For example, to aid uniform deployment across different browsers, JavaScript allows a number of core language primitives to be redefined and customized. This means that a JavaScript security library that may run alongside other partially-trusted libraries must take extra care so that its functionality is not subverted and its secrets are not leaked.
In this tutorial, we investigate approaches to build and verify JavaScript programs that implement security-criticial tasks, such as cryptographic protocols. Our programs must contend not just with the traditional network attacker, but also with a variety of web-specific attacks, such as malicious hosting websites and Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). In other words, not just the communication channel but even parts of the execution environment may be under the control of the adversary. We propose a typed subset of JavaScript, called Defensive JavaScript, that enables formal security guarantees for programs even in this threat model. Our language and verification results previously appeared in [12] .
Many existing works investigate the security of formal models of web application protocols [3, 17, 8] , but none of them can provide concrete security guarantees for JavaScript code. Still, we build upon these prior results (especially [8] ) to develop our threat model and verification techniques. Another closely related line of work investigates the use of type-preserving compilers to generate JavaScript programs that are secure-by-construction [18, 25] . We will focus only on languagebased protections in JavaScript, but note that HTML-level isolation techniques may also be effectively used to separate trusted web security components from untrusted JavaScript [4] .
In the rest of this section, we will seek to better understand the threat model and security goals of JavaScript security components through three examples.
Encrypted Cloud Storage Websites
Storage services (e.g. Dropbox) allow users to store their personal files on servers hosted within some cloud infrastructure. Since users often rely on these services to back up important files and share them across devices, the integrity and confidentiality of this data is an important security requirement, especially since the cloud servers may be under the control of a third party. Consequently, mainstream storage services typically encrypt user files before storing them in the cloud. A hacker who breaks into the cloud server to obtain the encrypted files would also need to steal the file encryption key from the storage service.
Some services, such as SpiderOak and Mega, seek to provide a stronger privacy guarantee to their users, sometimes called host-proof hosting -even if the storage service and its cloud servers are both hacked, the user's files should remain confidential. The key mechanism to achieve this goal is that a user's file encryption keys are generated and stored on the client-side; even the storage service does not get to see it, and so cannot accidentally leak it.
For example, to access their files stored on Mega, users visit the Mega website, which downloads and runs a JavaScript program in the browser. The program asks the user for a master passphrase, derives an authentication token and an encryption key from the passphrase, and sends the username and authentication token to the website. If the token matches the username, the web page allows the user to download or upload encrypted files from a cloud server. The JavaScript program encrypts and decrypts user files upon request, using the encryption key derived from the master passphrase, but the key and the passphrase never leave the browser.
Hence, the storage service implements an application-level cryptographic protocol in JavaScript. This programming pattern is also popular with other security web applications such as password managers (more below) and with privacypreserving websites like ConfiChair [5] and Helios [1] .
The main threat to this design is that if the attacker manages to inject a malicious script into the website, that script will be able to steal the master passphrase (and hence the user's files). This script injection may be achieved by hacking the web server, or by tampering with externally loaded scripts on the network, or by exploiting a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack. Many such attacks have been found in previous work [10, 7, 12] and reports from the MEGA bug bounty program indicate that such attacks are a common concern. Cloud storage websites employ many techniques to block these attack vectors, such as Strict Transport Layer Security [20] and Content Security Policy [24] , but the increasing incidence of server-side compromises, man-in-the-middle attacks on TLS, and XSS vulnerabilities on websites, indicates that it would be prudent to try to protect user data even if the website had a malicious script.
Even ignoring malicious scripts, to provide any formal security guarantee for a website security component that runs alongside unknown third party scripts, the component would need to be robust against bugs in these scripts. To give a concrete example, the MEGA website relies on about 70 scripts, and less than 10% of their code is related to cryptography; most of the rest implements the user interface. So the correctness of the cryptographic library and the secrecy of its keys relies on the good behavior of these UI scripts, which are not written by security experts and may be difficult to formally review.
Password Manager Bookmarklets and Browser Extensions
Password managers (e.g. LastPass) help users manage and remember their passwords (and other sensitive data such as credit card numbers) on various websites. They are often implemented in JavaScript and deployed as a browser extension or bookmarklet that detects the login page of a website, looks up a password database for a matching username and password, and offers to fill it in automatically. If there is no matching password, it may offer to generate a difficultto-guess password and store it in the database. To synchronize and backup the password database across a user's devices, many password managers implement the host-proof encrypted cloud storage pattern described above.
For example, LastPass users can generate a "Login" bookmarklet and add it to their browser's bookmarks. The bookmarklet contains a JavaScript program embedded with an encryption key for the user's password database. When a user next visits the login page at some website, she may click on the bookmarklet to automatically log in. Clicking on the bookmarklet executes its JavaScript program in the scope of the current page. The program contacts the LastPass website and retrieves the currently logged-in LastPass user's encrypted password data from the cloud server. It then uses the encryption key embedded in the bookmarklet code to decrypt the password for the current page and fills in the login form. If the browser does not have an active login session with LastPass, the bookmarklet has no effect.
The main threat to the bookmarklet design is that it may be clicked on a malicious website that may then tamper with the JavaScript environment to subvert the bookmarklet's functionality. A typical case is if the user accidentally clicks the bookmarklet on a website that looks like a known trusted site. Or the user has passwords for two different sites stored in her database, and one of them may have been compromised. In these situations, the main goal of the malicious website is to steal the user's password at a different honest website. The bookmarklet tries to prevent such attacks by identifying the website the bookmarklet has been clicked on and only using its embedded secret on trusted websites. However, identifying the host website and protecting the bookmarklet secret are difficult in a tampered JavaScript environment, leading to many attacks [2, 10, 7, 12] . We propose a programming discipline that enables secret-keeping bookmarklets that are robust against tampered environments.
As an alternative to bookmarklets, many password managers also provide a downloadable browser extension that executes a similar JavaScript program, but in a safer, more isolated JavaScript context. Password manager browser extensions are subject to their own threat model [9] , not detailed here. In particular, even extensions must protect their secrets from being leaked by bugs in other included JavaScript programs. To give a concrete example, the LastPass extension for the Google Chrome browser has 119 JavaScript files, of which only 5 contain any cryptography, but their security guarantees still must rely on the correctness of these other scripts.
Single Sign-On and Social Sharing Buttons
Single Sign-On protocols (e.g Facebook's Login button) are widely used by websites that wish to implement authenticated sessions without the hassle of user registration and password management. Another advantage is that the website can leverage their users' social networks to provide a richer experience (e.g. Facebook's Like button). From the user's viewpoint, single sign-on and social sharing buttons offer her a convenient and secure way of accessing and sharing data across different websites, without needing to remember different passwords.
For example, to include the Facebook Login button on a web page, a website W loads a JavaScript library provided by Facebook that displays the button. When a user clicks on the button, the program asks Facebook for the currently logged-in user's access token for the current website W . If the user is logged in and has previously authorized Facebook to provide an access token to W , Facebook returns the access token in a URL. Otherwise, the user is forwarded to a page where she may login and authorize W (or not). The program then gives the access token to the website and also provides functions to access the Facebook API and read or write (authorized elements of) the current user's social profile.
The protocol implemented by Facebook is OAuth 2.0 [19] , which also prescribes other message flows for server-side tokens and smartphones. Other popular single sign-on protocols, such as OpenID, SAML, and BrowserID, provide similar message flows that websites may use to obtain access tokens as user-specific credentials.
The main threat to the single sign-on interaction above is that the access token may be stolen by a malicious website and then used to impersonate the user at an honest website, or to read or write the user's profile information on her social network. The OAuth 2.0 flow is particularly vulnerable since access tokens are sent in URLs which may be leaked by Referer headers, or by HTTP redirection, or by various browser and application bugs [8, 26, 12] . Since the access token is used as a bearer token, and is often not specific to a website, it can be immediately used by the adversary on any website to impersonate the user.
The BrowserID single sign-on protocol seeks to mitigate the effects of token theft by using public key cryptography to authenticate the client 5 . Mozilla's implementation of BrowserID is written fully in JavaScript. The client includes a JavaScript cryptography library that may be included by any site to retrieve and sign tokens on behalf of the user. Even the single sign-on server is written in JavaScript and deployed over node.js. The design of BrowserID has been carefully evaluated by formal analysis [17] , but to prove the code correct, one must show that all the scripts loaded alongise behave safely. In Mozilla's implementation, the server-side protocol moduls is loaded among 158 other node.js modules, and a bug or malicious function in any of these modules could compromise both ther server's and user's private keys.
Towards Verifiably Secure Web Components
We have discussed three popular categories of JavaScript security components that seek to protect sensitive user data such as files, passwords, and access tokens from malicious websites using various combinations of authentication protocols and cryptography. Each of these components is used in conjunction with a number of other scripts that may modify the JavaScript environment.
Our goal is to write JavaScript security components in a style that their security can be formally proved even if the context is malicious. In particular, we aim for a language-level isolation guarantee for our programs -that their input-output functional behavior cannot be tampered with by the environment. As a corollary, any secrets that are correctly protected by cryptography in our programs cannot be stolen or modified by the adversary. This simple-sounding isolation guarantee would be trivial to obtain in traditional programming langugages with sound type systems, such as OCaml and Java. However, the flexibility of JavaScript breaks many guarantees presumed by the programmer and the language must be reined in before we can achieve our goal.
In Section 2, we discuss the peculiarities of JavaScript and the browser environment that make it difficult to isolate security components. In Section 3, we present Defensive JavaScript (DJS), a typed subset of JavaScript that guarantees isolation from the environment. In Section 4, we present a large cryptographic library written in DJS and use it to write and verify simple cryptographic web applications. Section 5 concludes.
Secure Messaging in an Untrusted Environment
As a motivating example, we consider how to implement a JavaScript program that sends an authenticated message to a server. Our target web page is hosted on a website W at URL http://W.com and it loads three scripts:
1 <html> 2 <body> 3 <script src="attacker1.js"></script> 4 <script src="messaging.js"></script> 5 <script src="attacker2.js"></script> 6 </body> 7 </html>
The first and third scripts are arbitrary malicious scripts chosen by the attacker. The second script is our program that provides an API to send messages to a server S at the URL http://S.com, via the XMLHttpRequest asynchronous messaging API provided by the browser. (In some cases, W may be the same site as S.) We assume that the program and S share a secret MACing key k. The program uses this key to attach a MAC to each message sent to S.
The security goal is message authentication: every message received and verified by S must have been sent by our program running at W . In particular, it should not be possible for the attacker scripts to steal the MAC key k and forge messages to S. The above web page scenario may seem too paranoid, but more generally, we want to guarnatee that that even if the surrounding scripts are just buggy, not malicious, they still cannot accidentally leak the key.
Secure Delivery of the Secret Key
The first challenge is to deliver the MAC key to messaging.js in a way that cannot be read by the other two attacker scripts.
Injecting the key as a token into the HTML document, or an HTTP cookie, or in browser local storage would not work; if the messaging script can read it, so can the attacker's script. The only safe place for the key is to embed it into the messaging program. But even in this case, there are many pitfalls. Consider the following messaging script messaging.js with a key included on top:
1 var key = k; 2 var api = function(msg){ .../*send authenticated message*/} Unfortunately, the attacker script attacker2.js can simply read the variable key from the environment and obtain the key. A better solution would be to protect the key within the function:
.../*send authenticated message*/ 4 } Now the script attacker2.js can no longer read the local variable key. However, it can retrieve the source code of the function api as a string by calling api.toSource(). It can then extract the embedded key k from the string. To protect the source code of the function, we need to rewrite the function by wrapping it within an anonymous function closure: Now, calling api.toSource() only reveals the code of the wrapper function, and the code of the real _api function (which embeds the key k) remains private.
There remains another way for the attacker scripts to obtain the source code of _api. If the script messaging.js is served from the current website's origin http://W.com, the source code of the whole script can be retrieved by either attacker script by making an XMLHttpRequest to the script's URL:
To prevent this, the messaging script must be served from a separate origin. For example, the website W could set aside a separate origin for serving only scripts, and place the messaging script at say http://scripts.W.com/messaging. js. in our example, it would also be suitable to source it from S's origin, say at http://S.com/messaging.js, so S can inject the shared key into the script. In both cases, the attacker scripts on http://W.com would be unable to make an XMLHttpRequest to read the code, due to the Same Origin Policy.
Calling External Functions
To construct and send a message, our messaging program will rely on several external functions either builtin to the JavaScript language or provided by the browser as part of the DOM library. For example, commonly used string functions such as concatenation (s.concat(t)) or search (s.indexOf(t)) are defined as methods in the String prototype. Other useful functions on arrays and objects are provided by the Array and Object prototypes. The window.Math object provides implementations of many mathematical functions. The XMLHttpRequest object allows asynchronous messaging with remote servers, and the postMessage API implements client-side messaging between windows. Finally, the document object (or DOM) provides functions for reading and writing the HTML document (e.g. document.getElementById(''body'')).
These external library functions are widely used by JavaScript programs. However, in our threat scenario, the attacker script attacker1.js may have redefined every one of these functions by modifying the String, Array, and Object prototypes, or by redefining these functions and objects in the window and document objects. For example, the following code redefines the XMLHttpRequest object, so that all messages send by the messaging script can be intercepted: This code exemplifies three dangers of calling an external function. First, the call to Crypto.HMAC leaks the key, since the attacker may have redefined the function. Consequently, the only safe choice here is to inline the code of the HMAC function into the messaging program. The HMAC function in turn relies on a hashing function (say which would also need to be included within the program.
(To see what these functions look like in JavaScript, see our implementation in Appendix A.) Second, the call to any external function exposes _api function to a stackwalking attack. For example, the attacker can redefine XMLHttpRequest.send so that when it is called, it reads the source code of its calling function using the caller method in the Function prototype: Adding the above code in attacker1.js will set up the environment such that when _api calls xhr.open, the attacker obtains the source code of _api and hence its embedded key. The attack relies on the implementation of the caller method, and it it works at least in Firefox at the time of writing. More generally, this kind of stack-walking is a powerful attack vector. Whenever a function f is called, it can access its caller by accessing f.caller, and the next level on the call stack by accessing f.caller.caller. At each level, it may examine (and even overwrite) the arguments of the function.
Third, if our messaging script ever calls an external function, the attacker may redefine its behavior so that the result of the function is not as expected. For example, s.concat(t) may always return a constant string or Math.pow may always return 0. In such cases, the functional integrity of our script has been compromised, and if the results of these functions are used in the MAC function, the authentication protocol may be broken even without leaking the secret key.
In summary, any external function calls from a the messaging script may lead to a full compromise of its secrets and its functionality. To be safe, the script must never call functions from within security sensitive functions whose source code or arguments may be secret. Instead, all external function calls should be factored out into a top-level wrapper function that calls a self-contained API: Here, the external function call to XMLHttpRequest is performed outside the sensitive API by a function msg_api that has no access to the secret MACing key. Walking the stack to get to msg_api does not allow the attacker to steal any secrets or to tamper with the _api function.
Implicit Calls to External Functions
In addition to explicit function calls, many JavaScript constructs implicitly trigger methods defined in various prototypes. Since these prototypes may be modified by the adversary, we must also avoid such implicit calls in defensive code.
The first category of implicit function calls are coercions. For example, in the expression e == e', if e is an object and e' is a number, then the equality will trigger an implicit coercion e.valueOf e was an object; rest of paragraph assumes string. This method valueOf is defined in the String prototype. More generally, comparison between any object and a string or a number may trigger the valueOf or toString methods in that object's prototype. Hence, by redefining these methods in the Object prototype, the attacker can intercept any function that triggers an implicit coercion and mount the attacks described in the previous subsection.
The second category of implicit function calls are getters and setters. Whenever an object is accessed at an undefined property (e.g. o.x), the JavaSript interpreter traverses the prototype hierarchy to see if the property x is defined in one of the prototypes that the object is derived from. If, say, none of the prototypes has defined x, but the Object prototype defines a getter function for x, then reading the property o.x will trigger this function. Similarly, if the Object prototype has a setter function for x, writing to o.x will call the setter.
By defining getters and setters for specific properties, an attacker script can cause trusted code to trigger an external function if it ever accesses an undefined property. Similarly, if an array or string is every indexed out of bounds, it may trigger a getter or setter in the Array prototype. Consequently, in our setting, the messaging program should never access arrays, strings, or objects outside their declared ranges. In particular, the popular JavaScript idiom of first declaring an empty object and then extending it is vulnerable to attack: A particular subcase of prototype poisoning is worth mentioning. JavaScript offers a for...in loop construct that goes through all the properties of an object. For example for (i in {x:1})print(i) is expected to print ''x'' and for (i in [1] )print(i) is expected to print the single array index 0. However, if the attacker modifies Object and Array prototypes to add more properties, those properties will also be printed here. Even checking that each property was defined locally within the object using the Object.hasOwnProperty function does not help, since this function could also be modified by the adversary.
Defensive Programming Idioms
We have discussed many potential attack vectors that a malicious script may employ when trying to subvert an honest JavaScript program running in the same environment. To prevent these attacks, we advocate a defensive programming discipline where programs aim to isolate their security-critical code from the environment by using function closures, by being loaded from a different origin, by refusing to explicitly call external functions, and by carefully preventing the triggering of coercions and prototype lookups. To systematically check our programs for all these isolation conditions, we propose a static type system. Defensiveness is a first step towards formal security guarantees. Once scripts like our messaging program are correctly isolated, we may rely on their contextindependent semantics and on the functional integrity of their cryptographic libraries to build automated security verification tools.
Alternative Mitigations. The injunction that the core messaging API must be fully self-contained may seem draconian and one may wonder if there are some cases in which calling external functions is safe. If the goal is only to prevent stack-walking, one may hide the stack by calling all external functions through a recursive wrapper function [25] . However, this requires a source-to-source translation to implement effectively, especially for object methods like xhr.send.
Recent versions of JavaScript give programs the ability to freeze objects and mark various properties as unmodifiable and/or unconfigurable (cannot be deleted). It is tempting to suggest that the website W should freeze some objects or that the browser should guarantee that some DOM properties are unforgeable. These objects and properties would then be safe to access. However, the problem with both Object.freeze and Object.defineProperty is that they need to apply to the top object in the object hierarchy, otherwise it is ineffective. For example, the properties document.location.href and window.location.href are commonly considered unforgeable since modifying them would take the webpage to a new location. Indeed, most browsers prevent JavaScript from redefining these properties. However, the attacker may directly redefine the window.document object (FireFox) or the window.location object (Internet Explorer).
Another option is for the website W to run a script first that makes copies of all relevant objects before they have been tampered by the attacker [18] . However, ensuring that a script runs first on a web page is surprisingly tricky [25] . Moreover, this solution does not work in scenarios where the website W itself may be malicious or compromised.
One may also use isolation mechanisms outside JavaScript, such as HTML iframes to effectively separate trusted and untrusted code [4] . In this paper, we do not investigate such mechanisms and instead focus only on language-based isolation. We note that the use of iframes relies on the semantics of the Same Origin Policy which remains to be fully standardized, let alone formalized [28] . Furthermore, iframes may not be available in some JavaScript runtime environments, such as smartphones and server applications. In these environments, defensive programming becomes necessary.
Defensive JavaScript
We present a subset of JavaScript that enforces a strong defensive programming discipline. Our language, Defensive JavaScript (DJS), imposes restrictions on JavaScript code both at the syntactic level and through a static type system. The main elements guiding the design of DJS are as follows:
Static Scopes. The variable scoping rules of JavaScript are notoriously difficult to understand. For example, functions may use local variables before they are declared. More worryingly, if a JavaScript program ever accesses a variable that is not in its local scope, this access may trigger a getter or setter in some prototype object. Consequently, we require that all variables in DJS programs be strictly statically scoped. We impose this by restricting the occurance of variable declarations (var) and by enforcing a strong scoping restriction on the bodies of with statements. Static Types for Functions, Objects, and Arrays. To prevent out-ofbound accesses to object properties, function arguments, and array indices, we require that all these objects be statically types. Notably, this means that the objects and arrays are not extensible and the types of variables cannot be changed. Furthermore, dynamic accesses to arrays and strings are only allowed when the index can be guaranteed to fall within bounds. Coercion-Free Operations. To avoid triggering coercions, we enforce strict types for all unary and binary operators. Comparisons, for example, can only be performed between expressions of the same types. Disjoint Heaps. To provide full isolation for our programs, we require that no heap references are imported or exported by DJS code. Importing an external object (array, function) is forbidden since accessing any of its properties may trigger malicious code. Exporting an internal object is forbidden because it may expose internal program state (and secrets) to the attacker. Hence, we require that DJS programs can only export scalar (string -> string) APIs.
Syntax
The syntax of DJS depicted in Figure 1 reflects these design constraints. Since DJS is a subset of JavaScript, much of the syntax is standard JavaScript and we refer the reader to the full language specification for more syntactic details [16] . DJS includes the standard JavaScript literals: booleans, numbers, strings, objects, and arrays. In fact, literals are the only way one may construct an object or an array. DJS does not allow object constructors, and extending an existing object or an array is forbidden.
DJS supports several unary ( ) and binary ( ) operators over numbers, strings, and booleans. Since these operators are built into the language and cannot be modified we can use them freely, except that the type system ensures that we do not trigger coercions.
Left-hand-side expressions denote the various ways that objects, strings, and arrays may be accessed in DJS code. Notably, dynamic accessors are severely limited. For example, properties cannot be accessed via the e[i] syntax (where i may have been dynamically computed). Instead, they must use the static accessor e.x. This helps the typechecker ensure (statically) that only explicitly defined properties are accessed (at runtime).
Arrays (and strings) can be accessed only at indexes that can be statically shown to fall within the array (and string) bounds. We allow three kinds of array indexes. The constant index e[η] is allowed when η is known to be within the bounds of the array. The integer index e[e &η] is allowed when η is an integer (0 ≤ η < 2 30 ) and is within the array bounds. The bounded access x[(e>>>0)%x.length] is always allowed.
Strings can be accessed with the three array access forms as well as a conditional form that checks that the index is within the length of the string before 
return function (x) {if (typeof x == ''string'') return _(x); }})(); Fig. 1 . Defensive JavaScript: Syntax accessing it, otherwise it returns a new string constant. The restrictions on dynamic accesses to objects, strings, and arrays are governed by the limits of our type system and type inference algorithm. With a more expressive type system, one may be able to allow other safe dynamic accessors.
Expressions include assignments, unary and binary operations, and function and method applications. Functions and methods must be fully applied; we do not allow optional arguments that may be left undefined.
Statements include if-then-else conditionals, while loops, and sequencing. Notably, variable declarations var x cannot appear in statements and property enumeration via for-in is forbidden. General for loops are allowed by the typechecker, even though they are not part of the formal syntax.
There are two mechanisms of introducing scope frames in DJS; functions (and methods) and with. The statement with (e) s takes an object expression e and makes its properties available as local variables to the statement s. To enforce static scoping, we require that all the free unqualified variables of s be properties in e. That is, looking up a free variable in the body of a with statement should never require looking beyond the current with context.
The syntax of functions is restricted to make it easier to infer their scope frames and return types. The function body begins with a series of variable declarations; in fact, this is the only place where var statements appear in DJS programs. The body continues with a series of statements and ends with a single return statement. The function is not allowed to invoke return anywhere else.
The top-level program p f is a wrapper around a single function f ; it ensures that the argument to the function is a string, calls the function, and returns the result. The wrapping ensures that the source code of the internal function is not leaked to the environment, and the argument typecheck ensures that the program does not accidentally import an external heap reference.
Typing
The type rules depicted in Figures 2 and 3 enforce the language restrictions described informally above. We write types and typing environments as follows:
Types and Environments
Method on object of type ρ (n ≥ 0) ρ ::= {x 1 : τ 1 , . . . , x n : τ n } Object Type (n ≥ 0) κ ::= f | w Scope frame kind: function or with
Types τ include the primitive base types of JavaScript, plus static types for objects, arrays, functions, and methods. Object types ρ look like records; they declare a fixed set of properties and assign a static type to each property. Unlike JavaScript, DJS array types [τ ] n require that all elements of the array must have the same type τ and that the array length (n) must be fixed at initialization.
Each function is given a type (τ 1 , . . . , τ n ) → τ r , which says that the function expects n arguments with the indicated types τ 1 , . . . , τ n and returns a result of type τ r . Method types look like function types, except that they have an additional implicit argument -the object within which the method resides, denoted by its type ρ. In DJS, methods may only be invoked with the syntax e.m(x 1 , . . . , x n ); it is, for example, forbidden to copy a method into a variable and invoke it without the object prefix.
Typing environments consist of a sequence of scope frames, where each frame looks like an object type ρ: it declares the types for a set of variables local to the frame. Each frame also has a kind annotation that denotes whether the frame was generated by a with statement or by a function (or method).
Most of the typing rules of DJS (Figures 2 and 3 ) are straightforwars. We give a brief overview, focusing on the more unusual rules:
-The rules for typing literals (Num, String, BoolTrue, BoolFalse, Object, Array) are standard. -The casting rules (BoolCast, NumCast, StrCast) allow specific conversions between primitive types that do not trigger coercions. -The type rules for operators (Concat, UnaryOp, ArithmeticOp, ComparisonOp, BooleanOp) ensure that their arguments are already of the required type, so that no coercions will be triggered during their execution. -The object access rule (Property) ensures that the property is declared within the object's type. -The three array access rules (ConstantIndex, IntegerIndex, BoundedIndex) ensure that the index is an unsigned integer between 0 (inclusive) and the array length (exclusive). The additional string indexing rule (ConditionalStringIndex) also ensures that the string is accessed at an unsigned integer index within the string. -Assignment requires the left and right hand sides to have the same type.
Formally, there is no subtyping in DJS, even though the DJS typechecker internally infers subtyping constraints. -The rules for control-flow statements (Sequence, If, While) are standard.
-The rule for with e s (With) introduces a new frame of kind w into the typing environment and uses this frame to typecheck the statement s. The frame consists of the properties in the object type of the expression e. -The variable scoping rules (VarLocal, VarFunctionScope) prescribe how to lookup a variable in the typing environment. We first look for a local variable in the current scope frame (VarLocal); if we fail, and if the current scope frame was introduced by a function definition, we look further back into the environment. If the current scope frame was introduced by a with statement, we never look further. Hence, a well-typed with context in DJS must define all the variables that may be used in its body, it cannot let any variable lookup escape to the surrounding context. -Function and method calls must be fully applied with arguments of the right types. Additionally, a method may only be called with an object of the expected object type ρ. -Function definitions introduce a sequence of scope frames. The first frame consists of only the argument variables, and is used to typecheck the first variable declaration. Each successive frame adds one local variable and is used to typecheck the next variable definition. After all local variables have been declared, the rest of the function body is typechecked with a frame that consists of all arguments and all local variables. -The rule for method definitions is similar to function definitions, except that the body is typechecked in a frame that includes an implicit this argument that has the object type ρ declared in the method type. -Programs have the scalar API type string -> string. In practice, the DJS typechecker is more general; it allows programs to export an object containing multiple scalar functions.
These typing rules are implemented by the DJS typechecker, which infers types automatically without any annotations. The source code and an online demo of the typechecker is available at http://defensivejs.com.
The DJS language and its type system imposes many restrictions on JavaScript programs. In exchange, well-typed DJS programs enjoy strong isolation guarantees. The key functional integrity property is called independence [12] :
Definition 1 (Independence). A program p f preserves the independence of f if any two sequences of calls to the result of p f with the same sequence of arguments, interleaved with arbitrary JavaScript code, return the same sequence of return values, as long as no call triggered an exception.
The other key property, called encapsulation [12] , guarantees that the DJS program's internal heap is isolated from the environment and that any internal secrets can only be leaked though the exported API. Well-typed DJS programs are guaranteed both these properties [12] .
Definition 2 (Encapsulation

Theorem 1 (Defensiveness).
If f : string → string then the DJS program p f encapsulates f over strings and preserves its independence.
Writing Defensive Cryptographic Applications
We present several case studies illustrating the use of DJS for building secure web components. We begin by describing three libraries, and then describing applications built with these libraries. Code sizes and verification details for these programs are listed in Table 1 . All our libraries, applications, and verification tools are available from http://defensivejs.com. 
Encoding and Decoding Strings
JavaScript applications often have to convert between different data encodings. Unicode strings are typically encoded in UTF-8. Byte arrays can be stored in integer arrays and converted either to ASCII strings, where each character represents a byte, or encoded in Base64, say for use in URLs. Typical website JavaScript relies on a variety of libraries to implicitly and explicitly interconvert between strings and byte arrays in various formats (e.g. window.atob, s.charCodeAt(i)). Since defensive code cannot rely on these libraries, we built our own encoding library that performs these conversions. The library currently supports byte arrays encoded in Hexadecimal, UTF-8, Base64, and ASCII and conversions between these formats.
The main limitation to using our DJS encoding library is performance, since it has no access to native objects and libraries. Since we cannot trust that the attacker has not tampered with efficient library objects like Int32Array, we encode all byte arrays as ASCII strings. Instead of relying on the String methods fromCharCode and charCodeAt, which may be modified by the adversary, we use large tables that map UTF-8 codes to their byte representations. The resulting performance penalty depends on the amount of data being encoded, and on the browser and hardware being used. We measured its impact on several applications (listed below), and surprisingly, even with the cost of encoding and decoding, DJS applications run as fast or faster than comparable JavaScript code. Of course, encoding performance could be vastly improved if the browser could provide access to an untamperable native library, such as the String prototype.
DJCL: Defensive JavaScript Crypto Library
We built a fully-featured JavaScript cryptography library in DJS, by adapting and rewriting well-reputed libraries like SJCL [23] (for symmetric cryptography) and JSBN (for public-key cryptography). Our implementation covers the following primitives: AES on 256 bit keys in CBC and CCM or GCM modes, SHA-1 and SHA-256, HMAC, RSA encryption and signature on keys up to 2048 bits with OAEP, PKCS1, or PSS padding. All our functions operate on byte arrays encoded as ASCII strings. Appendix A presents a detailed listing of the full code for our HMAC and SHA-256 functions.
Typing guarantees that the input-output behavior of the cryptographic functions cannot be tampered with by a malicious environment. However, this does not mean that our code correctly implements the cryptographic algorithm, or that it does not accidentally leak its secrets either explicitly in a return value or implicitly via a side-channel. Proving the functional correctness of our cryptographic library or its robustness against side-channels remains an open problem.
We evaluated the performance of various DJCL functions using the jsperf benchmark engine 6 on Chrome 24, Firefox 18, Safari 6.0 and IE 9. We found that our AES block function, SHA compression functions and RSA exponentiation performed at least as fast as their SJCL and JSBN counterparts, and sometimes even faster. We conclude that defensive coding is well suited for bit-level, selfcontained crypto computations, and JavaScript engines find it easy to optimize our non-extensible arrays and objects.
On the other hand, when implementing high-level constructions such as HMAC or CCM encryption that operate on variable-length inputs, we must pay the cost of encoding and decoding data as ASCII strings. Despite this performance penalty, even on mobile devices, DJCL achieves encryption and hashing rates upwards of 150KB/s, which is sufficient for most applications.
To further exercise our cryptographic library, we built an implementation of the upcoming W3C Web Cryptography API standard [15] , which is currently being implemented by various browsers and JavaScript libraries as an extension to the window object. We implement this API as a set of non-defensive functions that wrap DJCL. We compared the performance of our implementation on benchmarks provided by Chrome and Microsoft; our code is as fast as both native and JavaScript implementations provided by mainstream browsers.
JSON Serialization
Messaging applications in JavaScript widely use the JSON format, which is considered more compact and easier to use programmatically than XML. JSON defines a JavaScript-like syntax for serializing scalar objects and arrays. For example, the object {a:"s",b:[0,1]} is written in JSON notation as the string
All modern browsers provide libraries for serializing and deserializing JSON objects. The function JSON.stringify takes any JavaScript object and serializes it as a string, typically by ignoring any functions it finds in the object's structure. Conversely, the function JSON.parse takes a string and attempts to reconstruct a scalar JavaScript object from the string. DJS programs cannot use the browser's JSON library, since it may have been tampered by the adversary. So we build a defensive JSON library (DJSON) to provide this functionality.
DJSON.stringify is conceptually a simple function; it takes an object, enumerates its properties, and writes them out to a string. However, since the attacker may tamper the Object and Array prototypes, neither the for...in loop nor new APIs like Object.keys can be trusted to correctly enumerate properties. Consequently, DJSON.stringify takes an additional parameter -an object "schema" that describes the type of the JSON object. For example, to serialize the JSON example above, an application would call DJSON.stringify as follows: Given such a schema, DJSON.stringify ensures that the given object has all the fields and array indices declared in the schema before returning the serialized string; if the object does not match the schema it returns an error.
Implementing DJSON.parse is a bit more challenging, since the function needs to create a new object with an arbitrary number of properties. Creating an empty object and adding properties to it would not work, since the attacker may have set up malicious setter functions on the Object prototype. We define a defensive DJSON.parse function that requires three parameters -the string to parse, the schema for the expected JSON object, and a pre-allocated object that matches this expected schema. DJSON.parse does not create a new object; instead, it fills in this pre-allocated object. To return to our example, to parse the serialized JSON string, the application would first create an object result and then call DJSON.parse as follows: The schemas used for these two functions are closely related to the expected object types of the JSON objects. Indeed, our typechecker processes these schemas as type annotations and uses them to infer types for code that uses these functions.
Using explicit schemas with fixed object and array lengths imposes an important restriction; our JSON library only works with objects whose sizes are known in advance to the programmer. We have implemented extensions of DJS that use ML-style algebraic constructors (e.g. cons, nil) to allow extensible objects and arrays. The resulting encoded objects are less efficient than object literals but more flexible since they can represent dynamically-sized objects.
By combining our cryptographic library DJCL with DJSON, we implemented a family of IETF standards collectively called Javascript Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) [21] . These standards include JSON Web Tokens (JWT), which specifies authenticated JSON messages, and JSON Web Encryption, which specifies encrypted JSON messages. Our defensive JOSE library interoperates with other implementations of these specfications, and we use it to implement various cryptographic messaging protocols, such as Secure RPC (see below).
Applications
We briefly describe four DJS applications that we built using our libraries. We ran the DJS typechecker to verify their defensiveness. Furthermore, as we shall see in the next subsection, we also verifed their cryptographic security against both network and web attackers by translation to the applied pi calculus.
Secure RPC. Using the JOSE libraries, we programmed a variation of the secure messaging program of Section 2 in DJS. The program consists of a core typechecked API object that embeds a secret shared between the program and a trusted server S.
The API provides two functions: makeRequest takes a string and returns a serialized JWT object containing the argument and its HMAC; processResponse takes a string, parses it as a JWT object, verifies the HMAC and returns the payload (or an error). A non-defensive function then wraps this API to implement a secure RPC: it calls makeRequest to create the request, sends this request via XMLHttpRequest (or postMessage) to a recipient, waits for a response, calls processResponse and returns the result.
The security goal of this RPC application is authentication and correlation for the request and response. The goal relies on the secrecy of the HMAC key and the correct use of the HMAC function. Defensiveness guarantees that the key is not accidentally leaked, but the authentication protocol implemented by the application may still fail to achieve its goals. For example, the application may leak the key in its outgoing message or serialize the message incorrectly before MACing. We will see how to analyze the cryptographic security of the application using the protocol analyzer ProVerif [13] .
Password Manager Bookmarklet. We implemented a version of the LastPass password manager bookmarklet in DJS. The bookmarklet embeds a secret HMAC key, and when it is clicked on a website W , it performs a secure RPC with the LastPass website using this key to retrieve the currently logged in LastPass user's username and password for the website W and fill it in.
The security goal of the bookmarklet is to enable LastPass to authenticate that the user clicked the bookmarklet on the hosting website W . In particular, a malicious website W should not be able to steal the secret HMAC key or impersonate another website S, even if the user clicks the bookmarklet at W . At LastPass, the bookmarklet is authenticated by the secret key, whereas the website W is authenticated by the Origin header that the browser sends along with the XMLHttpRequest message. While many previous attacks have been found on password manager bookmarklets [2, 10] , our DJS-based solution is the first that can verifiably protect the bookmarklet and its secrets in this scenario.
Protecting Single Sign-On Tokens. We implemented a version of the Facebook JavaScript library that uses a DJS component to protect the user's Facebook access token from other scripts on the page. The DJS component embeds the access token and provides an API though which scripts on the page can access an authorized subset of the user's Facebook profile. The DJS script uses the access token as a MAC key to avoid leaking it to the environment.
In this design, malicious scripts on the page can access (parts of) the user's Facebook profile as long as the page is open, but do not get direct (long-term, offline) access to the access token, and they lose all access when the page is closed and the DJS script stops executing. In particular, the malicious script can never use the token to impersonate the user at another website.
An Encrypted Storage API. Our final DJS application implements an API for encrypted cloud storage. User files are encrypted at the client (via DJCL) and uploaded to a cloud server. The file encryption keys themselves are stored encrypted in local storage, using a master encryption key derived from a passphrase that is known only to the user. The user enters the passphrase on a protected login page (served from a distinct origin), and the derived key is subsequently embedded into a DJS script on the main storage service website.
By using DJS, we isolate the application code that implements cryptography from the rest of the page. Hence, an XSS attack on the main website cannot steal the file encryption key or the master encryption key. However, it can still read and modify user files as long as the page is open. As such, our proposed DJS API is the first to protect long term secrets on encrypted cloud storage websites from XSS attacks, unlike many previous designs [7] .
Verifying Applications with ProVerif
Well-typed programs in DJS enjoy functional integrity and heap isolation, so the environment can only interact with them through their exported scalar (string -> string) APIs. Even if the environment is malicious, it cannot access or interfere with the internal state of the program. This isolation guarantee makes it possible to analyze a DJS program independently of its environment, an immense advantage over traditional JavaScript.
DJS prevents some kinds of accidental leakage of secrets, but it cannot protect a program that leaks secrets through its exported interface. For example, even a well-typed DJS program may foolishly return a secret in the result of a public function. Furthermore, even though the DJCL cryptographic library is defensive, it cannot ensure that the application uses it correctly to achieve its security goals.
Designing application-layer cryptographic protocols is an error prone task (e.g. see the attacks in [10] ). We advocate the use of formal protocol analysis tools that can verify that DJS applications meet their goals.
We define a translation from DJS programs to processes in the applied pi calculus. The translation mimics previous formal translations to the applied pi calculus from F# [11] and Java [6] . These previous works prove translation soundness -every attack on the source program is present in its translation. However, we do not prove any soundness result for our translation.
Appendix B provides a detailed listing of the applied pi calculus translation for a simple DJS program that can send and receive authenticated messages.
Each DJS function is translated to a process following Milner's famous "functions as processes" encoding of the lambda calculus into the pi calculus [22] . The translated process waits for arguments on an input channel, computes the function result and sends it back on an output channel.
The DJS programmer may selectively prefix any function name by _lib. (thus placing it in the _lib object) to indicate that the code of the function should not be translated; instead the function should be treated as a trusted primitive. For example, we label all cryptographic primitives and encoding functions as trusted. Their code is not verified; instead, calls to these functions are translated to calls to symbolic constructors and destructors in the applied pi calculus.
The JavaScript heap and stack frames are modeled by a global private table heap that is indexed by unique references (fresh pi calculus names). Each object, array, function, and local variable corresponds to an entry in the table. A function can read and write an entry as long as it knows its reference.
Programs may contain two kinds of security annotations that will be treated specially in the translation. A function may log a security event by calling _lib. event. For example, _lib.event (Send(a,b,x) ) may indicate that a is going to use a secret key to authenticate a message x to b. These are translated to events in the applied pi calculus and are then used to specify authentication goals. A function may also label a certain value as secret (_lib.secret(x)). This expression is translated as the application of a private constructor, and is used to specify secrecy goals for an application.
The translated applied pi calculus process is composed with the WebSpi library and analyzed for violations of its security goals using the cryptographic protocol analyzer ProVerif. The WebSpi library models web browsers, web servers, and enables a variety of well-known web and network attacks. To model the malicious JavaScript environment, we give the attacker read and write access to the global heap table, but only for the entries for which he knows the references. The attacker cannot forge pointers. In addition, the attacker is given control over all public channels and access to the function input and output channels for the API exported by the DJS program. The attacker cannot directly access the processes corresponding to internal functions. Table 1 reports the ProVerif verification time for a few DJS applications. As depicted in Appendix B, ProVerif may find a counterexample to the security goals, which probably indicates an attack on the source DJS program. If ProVerif verifies the security goals, one gain some confidence in the application, but we caution that there may be other attacks not captured by our WebSpi model. Occasionally, ProVerif may not terminate, typically when the source program uses loops or recursive functions. In this case, the programmer may need to edit the source program or its translation to help ProVerif reach a conclusion.
Conclusions
We presented the design of DJS, a defensive subset of JavaScript that is particularly suited for programming web security components that may execute in malicious environments. DJS is not meant for programming whole websites. It does not allow access to any external libraries and imposes many language restrictions that may feel awkward to a typical JavaScript programmer, but are necessary for security on malicious websites. We have shown that large libraries such as DJCL and various applications can be programmed in DJS, at little cost to performance but great gains in security. We showed how DJS applications can be automatically verified for security using the cryptographic protocol analyzer ProVerif. As future work, we plan to relax some of the restrictions of DJS by relying on frozen and unforgeable objects in the environment, as well as by using more expressive types to capture more safe programs. We also plan to prove a formal soundness result for our translation from DJS to the applied pi calculus. 
B Verification Example
Source Program. We begin with the following DJS program that uses a cryptographic hash function _lib.hmac (as defined above) to authenticated messages between two scripts that are running on the same malicious page and which share a symmetric HMAC key.
Both scripts run the same core DJS program that embeds the key mac_key and provides an API with three functions: -mac takes a string message x, logs a security event Send(x) , and returns the HMAC of x using the key mac_key. -verify takes a string message x and a string t and verifies that t is the HMAC of x using mac_key. It then logs the event Accept(x,t,res) with the boolean result of the verification and returns the boolean. -guess is used to specify syntactic secrecy. It takes a string argument k and logs the event Leaked(k,true) if k is the same as the secret key mac_key.
These core functions may be used by untrusted wrapper functions to create messages that are then sent from one script to other via any communication mechanism, such as window.postMessage. We assume that this external wrapper code is under the control of the adversary, who may subvert it by tampering with the window object. Hence, for verification, we assume that the attacker can directly call our core API and state our goals using security events in this API. The intuition for the security events is that whenever Accept(x,t,true) is logged for a message x, that is the recipient program accepts x, it must be the case that Send(x) has been logged before, that is the sender program must have intended to send x. This is called a correspondence assertion [27] and is a common way of formalizing authentication goals in cryptographic protocols. Conversely, we expect that the event Leaked(k,true) is never logged, that is the HMAC key remains unknown to the adversary.
These authentication and secrecy queries are embedded on the top of the script using the _lib.spec function, which tells the ProVerif translator to directly embed its argument into the generated scripts. We run the ProVerif translator on this simple DJS library and verify that the API satisfies these queries. return function(s){if(typeof s=="string") return _(s)}; 49 })(); Generated Model. The ProVerif script generated by our model extraction tool (DJS2PV) is presented below to illustrate the translation. The script uses the typed applied pi calculus syntax described in [14] . It shows how the various DJS objects and variables are stored in the heap table, how the functions are encoded as processes, how the call to the _lib.hmac function is turned into a function call, and how all constant strings are extracted as top-level declarations.
The generated script relies on an external WebSpi library that defines all the types (String, Boolean, MemLoc, Function), the cryptographic functions (hmac, secret), and a table representing the JavaScript heap (heap). The WebSpi library encodes a rich attacker model that includes both web and network attacks. To verify DJS, we extend WebSpi to allow the attacker direct access to the JavaScript heap: the attacker can insert any object into the heap and read any object for which he knows the table index (representing the heap reference). More details on the original WebSpi library can be obtained from http://prosecco.inria.fr/webspi. Other verification examples that rely on WebSpi have appeared in [8, 7] .
